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Abstract 
This article compares the use of experiments as a research method in economics and psychology. We outline the most important 
differences between the two fields in terms of their use of experimental methods. The purpose of the article is two-fold. First, to 
provide an overview of areas where economic experiments differ from traditional psychological experiments. Second, to debate 
experimental economics in relation to experiments in other social sciences. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2002 the Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to the psychologist Daniel Kahneman and the experimental 
economist Vernon Smith. This signaled that knowledge from psychological research and the use of experimental 
methods is accepted as ‘mainstream’ in the field of economics. Both experimental economics and experimental 
psychology are concerned with many of the same issues, e.g. negotiations, different types of decisions, choice 
situations, and social dilemmas. There are also similarities when it comes to methodological choices, e.g. careful 
planning and design of experimental and advanced techniques used in data analysis. But, there are also areas of 
divergence. This can be attributed to the fact that the two disciplines have different aims and interests. Not 
surprisingly, economists are concerned with economic theories while psychologists are concerned with 
psychological theories. This has implications for the choices which are made with respect to experimental designs, 
and the views on using incentives, deception, or how to recruit participants.  
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This article compares the use of experiments as a research method in economics and psychology. We outline the 
most important differences between the two fields in terms of their use of experimental methods. The purpose of the 
article is two-fold. First, to provide an overview of areas where economic experiments differ from traditional 
psychological experiments. Second, to debate experimental economics in relation to experiments in other social 
sciences. It is the view of the authors that economists have been slow in terms of their take-up of insight and 
knowledge from other social sciences. Instead, economists have oriented themselves towards the natural sciences 
(McCloskey, 1985). Even though the cross-disciplinary researcher Herbert Simon won the Nobel Prize in 
Economics a long time ago, many years passed before his theories of bounded rationality and decision-making 
gained a strong foothold in mainstream economics.  
Discussing convergence and divergence between economics and other social sciences can potentially create more 
possibilities for cross-disciplinary work. Traditionally, there has been little dialogue between economics and other 
social scientists. This may be because they do not speak the same ‘language’. As pointed out by Ariely and Norton 
(2007: 336) “(…) at their core, economics and psychology share a common and overriding desire to understand 
human nature, but communication between the two is still in its infancy.” The possibility for more cooperation is 
now higher, as experimental methods and certain psychological theories have become a legitimate part of 
mainstream economics.  
This is not the first article which discusses and comments on aspects of experimental economics (Davis & Holt, 
1993; Hey, 1991; Kagel & Roth, 1995) or differences between economists’ and psychologists’ use of experimental 
methods (Ariely & Norton, 2007; Friedman, 1994). Still, we argue that the article contributes by providing a short 
overview of the main points of convergence and divergence. We have attempted to draw on previous contributions 
and viewpoints from both disciplines. Due to space limitations, we are unable to give a complete picture. Therefore, 
in certain areas our article may not do justice to the literature. This is particularly challenging since these 
experimental economics is a research area which is in rapid development. 
The article is structured as follows: First we briefly discuss the notion of validity in experimental methods, and 
the importance of internal and external validity. Then we discuss six aspects of economic experiments, in light of 
criticism from psychologists and others. The article ends with a discussion of areas of convergence and divergence.  
2. Validity issues in experimental methods 
Experimental methods are known for scoring high on internal validity, which means that the researchers can be 
relatively certain that a demonstrated cause-and-effect relationship actually exists. In experimental economics 
internal validity is of utmost importance since economists aim to predict human behavior when faced with 
incentives. In general, economic theories are abstract and universal in nature, with the aim that they should be 
applicable across different situations and individuals. This makes contextual factors and the characteristics of the 
participants less important in economic experiments than in other types of experiments. In addition, economic 
theory is generally based on assumptions that actors are rational and capable of understanding the relationship 
between actions and payoffs.  As a result, participants do not expect to be deceived. Any irrational behavior is 
interpreted as noise or biases. Instead, the experiments are repeated and market mechanisms are used to discipline 
behavior. 
However, experimental methods are weak on external validity, meaning the extent to which the findings can be 
generalized to situations outside the setting where the experiment takes place. Experimental economists also make 
certain adjustments which they claim will alleviate the problems related to low external validity. For instance, there 
is strict control of context and incentives, and the use of disciplining market mechanisms and repetition. These are 
aspects of experimental methods which some argue enhance external validity (Loewenstein, 1999). However, many 
researchers in psychology will tend to disagree and claim that strict control of contextual factors reduces the external 
validity since it creates an artificial laboratory situation. Cognitive and learning psychologists will typically claim 
that real-life learning is situation-dependent. In the next part of the article these aspects are discussed in more depth.  
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3. Key aspects of the methodology used in economic experiments 
We identify and discuss six aspects of economic experiments: Incentives, market mechanisms, repetition, 
recruitment of participants, context, and finally, deception. These aspects are discussed with reference to criticism 
from psychologists and behavioral economists. 
Experimental economists use the notion of ‘induced valuation’, which means that the participants are 
compensated in relation to the theory which is tested and the choices they make (Smith, 1976).  Experimental 
economists therefore use incentives because they view them as necessary to ensure the validity of the experiment 
and to achieve the goal of testing economic theory. The use of incentives will ensure that the participant will act 
‘normally’. Therefore, the incentives have to be clearly defined so that the participants are able to calculate the costs 
and benefits of every choice, as predicted by standard economic theory (Edwards, 1961). An important question 
relates to the size of the incentives. It is also important to discuss the size of the amount in order to ensure the 
realism of the experiment. Are the participants paid enough in relation to their opportunity cost (e.g. part-time job) 
and the mental cost of participating (Smith & Walker, 1993)? It is also natural to judge whether the amount is large 
enough relative to the general cost-of-living in the country where the experiment is conducted, so that the 
participants view the incentives as real.  
Psychologists are generally skeptical towards the use of economic incentives. Psychologists believe that in the 
real world costs and benefits are not as clearly defined. Using strong incentives can make the lab experiments less 
transferable to the real world. By not defining incentives, there is more variance in terms of participants’ behavior, 
something that psychologists view as a more correct picture of the real world (Ariely & Norton, 2007: 338) .  
This does not mean that incentives are never used in psychological experiments. But when used by psychologists, 
incentives are used in a different way. In psychological experiment the participants are usually given a fixed sum 
independent of their decisions. Psychologists typically argue that even though incentives are used, there are many 
other factors which influence participants (e.g. conformity, norms of appropriateness). This is neglected by 
economists. Economists typically offer participants anonymity to reduce such behavior. Still, much psychological 
and sociological research shows that even if guaranteed anonymity, people care about their reputation, self-concept 
and will conduct ‘impression management’ to varying degrees (Goffman, 1959; Schlenker, 1980). Anonymity can 
also induce demand characteristics (Intons-Peterson, 1983; Orne, 1962) as the participants expect a different type of 
behavior that would be the case if they were not anonymous. The results of experiments can also to a certain degree 
be due to a Hawthorne effect, but some economists argue that this effect was exaggerated in the original 
experiments (Levitt & List, 2009).  
Economists make much use of market mechanisms in their experiments. Optimal behavior is rewarded while sub-
optimal behavior is punished. These feedback mechanisms discipline irrational behavior. The effect is particularly 
strong when the game or negotiation situation is repeated several times. This can be criticized since there arguably 
are not that many real-time situations where a person gets a rapid and frequent feedback as in economic 
experiments. Loewenstein (1999) argues that such mechanisms are only existing in certain situations and for some 
types of work (e.g. currency traders). For most people, most types of economic choices are made in situations where 
feedback is not rapid enough to correct behavior.  
In economic experiments repetition is used to a high degree. For example, a game or a negotiation situation is 
repeated several times. Over time, the behavior becomes more optimal. This is interesting in order to understand 
learning and how humans react to incentives and modify their behavior. However, it can be argued that the optimal 
behavior which is observed at the end of experiments after a number of  repetitions is not representative for how the 
participant will act in other economic situations (Loewenstein, 1999). Loewenstein (1999) argues that even though 
humans learn when they are in a tightly controlled experimental situation, this does not mean that they learn in the 
same way outside of the lab. The type of learning which is observed in a structured experimental lab trial is not very 
representative of what is encountered in real life. Others will also argue that learning is situation-dependent. 
Psychologists specializing in learning and pedagogy will stress the importance of situated learning (Lave & Wenger, 
1991). Research has shown that humans have difficulties in transferring knowledge (or optimal behavior) from one 
situation to another. Cognitive abilities, problem-solving and learning are to a large extent situation-dependent 
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(Hung, 2002). This brings our discussion to another important aspect of economic experiments, namely the role of 
the context in experiments.  
Economists and psychologist differ greatly when it comes to the importance of context in experiments. 
Experimental economists have the context-free experiment as an ideal, and try to construct neutral experimental 
contexts because their aim to develop theory which is universally applicable. Therefore, the theory cannot be tested 
in a particular context. In addition, the context creates noise and variance in the data material. The context may also 
create demand characteristics and biases. Psychologists typically argue that creating a context-free lab setting is 
artificial. This criticism is known as the ‘artificiality criticism’ (Stanovich, 2007). This view is shared by many 
psychologists. Cognitive psychologists argue that cognition and problem-solving to a large extent is situation-
dependent. In contrast with economists, psychologists will manipulate the context. For example, they may fill the 
lab with smoke or use other ‘tricks’. Psychologist may also use so-called ‘priming’ of the sub-consciousness to 
manipulate participants. Research has shown that such subliminal priming can affect the choice of for instance 
brands (Karremans, Stroebe, & Claus, 2006).  
Economic theories are general and aim to be applicable to different types of participants. Economists try to 
create simple theories which explain and predict behavior of a large number of people in different situations. At the 
same time, it is usually tolerated that the assumptions underlying the theories are imperfect as long as they have 
predictive power. In contrast, psychologists and other behavioral scientists aim to create more complex theories, 
which may only explain behavior in a certain group or in a certain context. As a result, economists have a tendency 
to place less emphasis on the characteristics and make-up of the participant group (e.g. demographics). That being 
said, it should be mentioned that even some experimental economics have started to take into consideration 
individual and cultural variations.  
Another area of divergence is related to how participants are recruited. Economists typically recruit paid 
volunteers, while psychologists, particularly in the US, have relied extensively on undergraduate psychology majors. 
There are many researchers who have criticized the widespread use of American college students in psychological 
experiments. For example, it is pointed out this group is very homogeneous and that these students already are 
familiar with some of the theories which are tested. In addition, these students are young and may not have fully 
developed their identities and attitudes. This criticism is referred to as ‘the college sophomore problem’ (Stanovich, 
2007). The same type of criticism can possibly be leveled at economic experiments where business and economics 
majors are often used as participants.  
Deception of participants is taboo among experimental economists (Bonetti, 1998). Economists tend to argue that 
it is unnecessary to deceive participants because they are aiming at creating an experimental situation where the 
context is abstracted away. Hiding the purpose of the experiment has little value for economists since they believe 
this will reduce the participants’ ability to make informed choices. In addition, deception can have other costs since 
participants can become suspicious and see it as a breach of trust (A. Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002). Psychologists, on 
the other hand, actively use deception in their experiments and believe it is an acceptable practice (Andreas Ortmann 
& Hertwig, 1997). Researchers use cover stories and helpers among the participants to ensure that the participants 
behave as would do outside of the laboratory. From the history of psychology there are many examples of 
experiments where deception has been used to extreme lengths, e.g. Milgrom’s and Zimbarbo’s famous experiments 
(Mandler, 2007).  
4. Discussion and conclusion 
One of the main points of the article has been to show that the methodological choices made by economists and 
psychologists are a product of the disciplines’ unique approaches to understanding human nature and behavior. The 
article has shown that even though economists and psychology share an interest in understanding and explaining 
human nature and behavior, there are substantial differences between the two disciplines which makes it hard to 
bridge and unite them. Nevertheless, the potential value of cross-disciplinary work should be high, which means that 
researchers should try to work together. In addition, the increased recognition that other social sciences get within 
the field of economics signals that a dialogue is possible.  
Both experimental economics and experimental psychology should reflect more on own methodological positions 
when it comes to for instance the use of incentives and deception of participants (Ariely & Norton, 2007). Instead of 
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making for instance deception a moral or ethical question, economists could instead discuss how deception could 
contribute to understand human behavior. In the same way, psychologists could start using incentives and market 
mechanisms in their experiments. This could help alleviate concerns about whether participants are taking the 
experiments  seriously,  and  also  open  up  the  possibility  of  actors  behaving  in  line  with  what  is  predicted  by  the  
rational actor-model proposed in mainstream economic theory.  
In the article we have shown that economists and psychologist differ greatly when it comes to several aspects of 
their use of experimental methods. These fundamental methodological differences could make dialogue more 
difficult. For psychologists it may be difficult to communicate their findings to economics if incentives have not 
been  used,  or  if  they  have  only  used  a  fixed  amount  of  compensation  independent  of  the  choices  made  by  the  
participants. Hence, if psychologists hope to influence economists it is important to control for the use of incentives. 
This is particularly important when presenting results which fly in the face of standard economic theory. If 
incentives are not used, it may be too easy for economists to argue that the results are not credible due to non-use of 
incentives. Another example is the use of deception. Among economists there are strong norms that participants 
should not be deceived. Hence, it could be difficult for psychologists to publish such research in economic journals.  
Despite the differences there should be many possibilities for more cross-disciplinary research. Particularly 
experimental economists should have much to gain from a dialogue with researchers from other disciplines such as 
psychology, which has a much longer history of using experiments (cf. Mandler, 2007). Experimental economics, 
despite having been around for 50-60 years, still has many unexplored areas, and there is reason to believe 
experimental methods can continue to shed light on many areas of economic life.  
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